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ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENTS RESULTING FROM MEDIATION UNDER 
THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION 
Private International Law Issues in Perspective 
This article introduces the Singapore Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation (“the Convention”). It discusses the enforcement 
of mediated settlement agreements under the Convention 
against the background of private international law. First, the 
Convention and its genesis are introduced. Second, the 
rationale and scope of the Convention are examined. Third, 
the Convention is placed in the context of private 
international law. Fourth, the requirements for enforcement 
of an international mediated settlement agreement (“IMSA”) 
under the Convention are laid out. Fifth, the grounds for 
refusal of judicial enforcement of IMSAs are examined. The 
article ends with a conclusion and outlook. 
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I. Introduction 
1 The Singapore Convention on International Settlement 
Agreements Resulting from Mediation1 (“Singapore Convention”) is a 
welcome addition to the toolbox of mechanisms for the enforcement of 
cross-border dispute resolution outcomes. Many stakeholders in the 
cross-border mediation community have high hopes that the Singapore 
Convention would do for mediation what the Convention on the 
                                                          
1 GA Res 73/198, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd Session 
(20 December 2018). 
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Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards2 (“New York 
Convention”) has achieved for arbitration. The Singapore Convention 
aims at establishing regulatory robustness,3 which is essential for 
elevating cross-border mediation to the role of a relevant player amongst 
the well-recognised and frequently utilised international dispute 
resolution forums such as litigation and arbitration.4 
2 The genesis of the Singapore Convention can be attributed to a 
delegation from the US.5 At the end of the 2014 United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Commission 
session, the delegation submitted a proposal6 that UNCITRAL Working 
Group II (Dispute Settlement) (“WG II”) should begin to examine how 
the attractiveness of mediation would be increased, if settlement 
agreements reached at the conclusion of a successful process could be 
enforceable in an expedited manner under some form of international-
level treaty or instrument.7 Consequently, in 2015, WG II commenced 
deliberations for the preparation of an instrument (or, possibly, 
instruments) which would provide a mechanism to enhance the 
enforcement of international commercial settlement agreements 
resulting from mediation (hereinafter referred to as international 
mediated settlement agreements or “IMSAs”). 
                                                          
2 330 UNTS 3 (10 June 1958; entry into force 7 June 1959). 
3 On regulatory robustness, see generally Nadja Alexander, “Introducing Regulatory 
Robustness Ratings for Mediation Regimes in the EU” in EU Mediation Law 
Handbook – Regulatory Robustness Ratings for Mediation Regimes (Nadja 
Alexander et al eds) (Wolters Kluwer, 2017). 
4 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 38. 
5 Hal Abramson, “New Singapore Convention on Cross-Border Mediated 
Settlements: Key Choices” in Mediation in International Commercial and 
Investment Disputes (Catharine Titi & Katia Fach-Gomez eds) (Oxford University 
Press, 2019, forthcoming) at pp 3–4 (draft version). On the decision-making 
process, see Stacie Strong, “The Role of Empirical Research and Dispute System 
Design in Proposing and Developing International Treaties: A Case Study of the 
Singapore Convention on Mediation” (2019) 20 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 
(forthcoming). 
6 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter 
“UNCITRAL”), Proposal by the Government of the United States of America: Future 
Work for Working Group II (A/CN.9/822) (2 June 2014). 
7 Timothy Schnabel, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for 
the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements” (2019) 
19 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 1. Timothy Schnabel proposed and negotiated the 
forthcoming Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation GA Res 73/198, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 
73rd Session (20 December 2018) (hereinafter “Singapore Convention on 
Mediation”) on behalf of the US. 
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3 In February 2018, during its 68th session in New York, WG II 
concluded its work, having come to a consensus on the drafting of two 
instruments: the Convention and the Model Law on International 
Commercial Mediation8 embracing the principles found within the 
Convention. On 25 June 2018, UNCITRAL at its 51st session 
recommended that the final draft of the Convention be submitted to the 
United Nations (“UN”) General Assembly for its consideration, and 
adopted the Model Law.9 The UN General Assembly adopted the 
Convention on 20 December 2018, confirming that it shall be referred 
to as the “Singapore Convention on Mediation” and authorising that it 
be open for signature at a ceremony in Singapore on 7 August 2019.10 
4 In this article, the authors examine the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation focusing on four themes. First, the rationale and scope of 
the Convention will be studied. Second, the application of the 
Convention will be considered against the background of private 
international law. Third, the requirements for enforcing IMSAs under 
the Convention will be investigated. Fourth, the circumstances under 
which judicial refusal of IMSA enforcement is permitted under the 
Convention will be determined. 
II. Rationale 
5 As an instrument that endeavours to provide a legal mechanism 
for the expedited enforcement of IMSAs across several jurisdictions, the 
Singapore Convention promotes conclusiveness of dispute resolution 
outcomes.11 This fosters confidence in the mediation process in respect 
to cross-border commercial disputes. International commercial 
mediation becomes a more attractive and accessible forum of alternative 
                                                          
8 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018 (amending 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 2002) 
GA Res 73/199, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd Session 
(20 December 2018). 
9 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Fifty-first 
Session (A/73/17) (25 June–13 July 2018). 
10 United Nations, “General Assembly Adopts the United Nations Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation”, press release 
(UNIS/L/271) (21 December 2018) <www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/
2018/unisl271.html> (accessed 23 June 2019). 
11 Shouyu Chong, “Conflict of Laws and Cross-border Commercial Mediation: 
Breaking New Ground with the Forthcoming United Nations Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation through a Conflict 
of Laws Analysis of Its Grounds for Refusal to Enforce International Commercial 
Mediated Settlement Agreements” (2018) (unpublished directed research paper 
undertaken during LLM studies, National University of Singapore, archived at the 
C J Koh Law Library, National University of Singapore) at pp 6–7. 
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dispute resolution and is elevated to possess the same status as 
international commercial arbitration. Whilst many mediation providers 
across the world enthusiastically proclaim that IMSAs should enjoy high 
compliance rates,12 lawyers and business people often remain cautious 
when deciding whether to proceed with international mediation at the 
occurrence of a dispute.13 At least from the perspective of a “common 
law” lawyer, it is common practice14 to first file a suit with the courts 
(or to initiate arbitration proceedings) and subsequently apply for a stay 
of proceedings in favour of mediation or out-of-court negotiations 
(sometimes upon recommendation of the court).15 Only then will the 
parties proceed to the mediation table in an attempt to resolve their 
conflict. 
                                                          
12 Chang-fa Lo & Janice Lee, “A New Approach for the Settlement of Regional 
Disputes to Maintain Dynamic Stability – A Selective Elaboration of the Draft 
Agreement on the Establishment of the Asia-Pacific Regional Mediation 
Organisation” (2018) 13 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and 
Policy 27 at 40–41: “[T]he chances of the parties reneging on their obligations and 
not performing according to the agreed terms and conditions [of the mediated 
settlement agreement] is limited”. Nolan-Haley shares similar sentiments, in 
Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, “Judicial Review of Mediated Settlement Agreements: 
Improving Mediation with Consent” (2013) 5 Yearbook on Arbitration and 
Mediation 152 at 158–159. Also consider Klaus J Hopt & Felix Steffek, “Mediation: 
Comparison of Laws, Regulatory Models, Fundamental Issues” in Mediation: 
Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective (Klaus J Hopt & Felix Steffek 
eds) (Oxford University Press, 2013) at pp 105–106; Craig A McEwen & Richard 
J Maiman, “Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance through 
Consent” (1981) 18 Law & Society Review 11; and Lucy Reed, “Ultima Thule: 
Prospects for International Commercial Mediation”, NUS Centre for International 
Law Working Paper 19/03 (unpublished) (January 2019) at p 18 
<https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3339788> (accessed 23 June 2019). 
13 Consider the concern raised by American practitioners observed by Stacie Strong, 
who noted that, at least from the American perspective, “voluntary compliance 
with settlement agreements is declining, thereby increasing the need for legal 
enforcement mechanisms [for mediated settlement agreements in court]”: Stacie 
Strong, “Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International 
Commercial Mediation” (2016) 74(4) Wash and Lee L Rev 1973 at 2014; see also 
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, “Mediation: The ‘New Arbitration’” (2012) 17 Harv 
Negot L Rev 61 at 88–89. 
14 Anecdotally, some “common law” lawyers would go further to consider this good 
practice. 
15 For a recent example in Singapore, peruse the precedent of Lim Sze Eng v Lin Choo 
Mee [2019] 1 SLR 414. The case involved a winding-up petition of a company run 
by brothers who had fallen out with each other. Whilst a first round of mediation 
ordered by a judge held between April and May 2015 to resolve their differences 
failed and the High Court (court of first instance) of Singapore ordered for the 
winding-up of the company, a second round of mediation ordered by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal held in December 2015 yielded a settlement agreement. 
Unfortunately, the settlement agreement was dishonoured, and the parties 
involved eventually sued each other in 2018 for damages arising from the breach of 
the settlement agreement. This was the subject matter of the judgment. 
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6 Several reasons for this practice can be identified. From the 
point of view of a practitioner unfamiliar with mediation, the 
obligations enshrined in IMSAs may appear to be inconsistently 
enforced in different jurisdictions when they are subject to challenges in 
court.16 This leads to unpredictability and uncertainty in dispute 
resolution outcomes. Without an expedited enforcement mechanism, 
IMSAs are ordinarily enforced as legally binding contracts with an 
international character.17 The IMSA may have a procedural element in 
addition to its substantive contractual content if litigation or 
enforcement issues are covered.18 As such, IMSAs are subject to the 
relevant, but potentially idiosyncratic, mandatory rules and vitiating 
factors of the forum (for example, undue influence, unconscionability 
and illegality) administered in light of the private international law rules 
of the enforcing jurisdiction. This may prove costly for parties when 
disputes are concluded by settlement agreement through mediation, as 
further legal advice may be required at the jurisdiction(s) to which the 
IMSA will be taken to be enforced. 
7 If an IMSA is brought to Singapore, which is a common law 
jurisdiction, for enforcement, courts are usually reluctant to order 
specific performance of contractual obligations if they are of the opinion 
that awarding damages would sufficiently compensate the innocent 
party to a dishonoured IMSA.19 There is also precedent from the 
                                                          
16 At least in the US, challenges in court to enforceability of settlement agreements 
have been very common: see James R Coben & Peter N Thompson, “Disputing 
Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation about Mediation” (2006) 11 Harv Negot 
L Rev 43 at 47–48; and James R Coben & Peter N Thompson, “Mediation 
Litigation Trends: 1999–2007” (2007) 1 World Arbitration & Mediation 
Review 395. 
17 Nadja Alexander, International and Comparative Mediation: Legal Perspectives 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2009) at p 328. 
18 Felix Steffek, “Internationales Recht” in Recht der Alternativen Konfliktlösung 
(Reinhard Greger, Hannes Unberath & Felix Steffek eds) (CH Beck, 2nd Ed, 2016) 
at F 40. 
19 See Lee Chee Wei v Tan Hor Peow Victor [2007] 3 SLR(R) 537 at [52]–[53]; The 
Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy 
Publishing, 2012) at paras 23.067–23.154; and Mindy Chen-Wishart, Contract Law 
(Oxford University Press, 6th Ed, 2018) at p 546 ff. This is because “[t]he court 
gives specific performance instead of damages, only when it can by that means do 
more perfect and complete justice”: Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction 
Rly Co (1874) 9 Ch App 279 at 284, per Lord Selborne. See Turf Club Auto 
Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2017] 2 SLR 12 at [156]: the Singapore Court 
of Appeal opined that non-compliance of a settlement agreement, which was 
subsequently recorded as a consent order by the High Court, “had the effect of 
prospectively terminating the parties’ agreement and releasing the parties from 
future obligations” [emphasis in original]. As such, the Court of Appeal awarded 
compensatory damages to the innocent parties in view of the breach of settlement 
agreement: see Turf Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua [2018] 
2 SLR 655. 
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Singapore courts to grant equitable relief to parties from having to fulfil 
some of their contractual obligations. The rule against “penalty” clauses 
serves as an illustration,20 where an expressed secondary obligation for 
one party to the IMSA to pay another a sum of money in the event of a 
breach of its terms may not inevitably be enforced if the courts opine 
that the said payment clause amounts to a “penalty”.21 If, on the other 
hand, an IMSA is brought to Germany, which is a civil law jurisdiction, 
for enforcement, specific performance is the default position.22 Under 
German law, the enforcement of penalty clauses may also be restricted. 
However, these restrictions are not identical with the principles applying 
to penalty clauses under English and Singapore case law.23 
8 Hence, to promote the conclusiveness of dispute resolution 
outcomes arising from cross-border commercial mediation, the 
Singapore Convention is desirable, as it endeavours to converge the 
functions of IMSAs with arbitral awards, galvanising its enforceability 
uniformly across signatory states.24 This appears to reflect the sentiment 
of practitioners and other members of international business and legal 
communities who participated in a 2014 study to examine the 
desirability of such a Convention when it was but a proposal: 74% of 
respondents polled expressed the belief that a multilateral convention 
establishing a cross-border enforcement mechanism for IMSAs would 
                                                          
20 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 
(“Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre”); the ratio of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre represents the 
position in Singapore law (Xia Zhengyan v Geng Changqing [2015] 3 SLR 732); see 
also Goh Yihan & Yip Man, “English Reformulation of the Penalty Rule – 
Relevance in Singapore? Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye 
Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; [2015] 3 WLR 1373” (2017) 29 SAcLJ 257, though it 
may be modified in light of the UK Supreme Court decision of Cavendish Square 
Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; [2015] 
3 WLR 1373 by a Court of Appeal ruling in the near future. 
21 It is impliedly assumed in this illustration that the choice of law of the 
international mediated settlement agreement (“IMSA”) points to Singapore law. 
See iTronic Holdings Pte Ltd v Tan Swee Leon [2016] 3 SLR 663 at [165] for the 
current position taken by the Singapore High Court. For completeness, obligations 
to pay a sum of money upon a breach of the IMSA, to transfer property either for 
nothing or at undervalue, as well as to pay a sum of money to the other party to the 
IMSA as a deposit (which may be forfeited upon its breach) could be construed as 
secondary obligations susceptible to relief: Goh Yihan & Yip Man, “English 
Reformulation of the Penalty Rule – Relevance in Singapore? Cavendish Square 
Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2016] AC 1172; [2015] 
3 WLR 1373” (2017) 29 SAcLJ 257 at 263, para 12. 
22 See Felix Steffek, “Internationales Recht” in Recht der Alternativen Konfliktlösung 
(Reinhard Greger, Hannes Unberath & Felix Steffek eds) (CH Beck, 2nd Ed, 2016) 
at F 55 ff. 
23 See §§ 339 ff of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) and § 348 of the 
German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch). 
24 See Art 4 of the Singapore Convention on Mediation, which sets out the 
requirements for reliance on mediated settlement agreements. 
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encourage parties to resort to mediation services more frequently.25 
At least in Singapore, specific performance of clearly defined obligations 
established in an IMSA would seem to be available to parties, if 
enforcement were to be sought under the Convention. Enforceability of 
IMSAs in the courts of signatory states under the Convention may only 
be challenged under some circumscribed conditions found in Art 5,26 
resulting in a more predictable and certain enforcement regime. 
9 Further, the Convention promotes a consensual and non-
legalistic method of resolving disputes, embracing the intangible 
elements of business relationships – such as notions of respect, 
reputation and contextual sensitivity to business cultures – so as to 
secure continuity of co-operation, which may produce further economic 
benefits for society. In contrast with the adjudicative forums of dispute 
resolution such as arbitration and litigation, mediation is a harmonious 
alternative. It affords parties with an appreciably more informal and 
fluid setting for dispute resolution to take place, making room for them 
to consider extra-legal considerations which could truly yield the point 
in contention.27 Addressing the relevant elements at mediation with 
nuance, discretion and sensitivity – in contrast with proceeding with a 
large team of expensive high-profile lawyers to battle tooth-and-nail 
with each other to the bitter end at litigation or arbitration – can 
produce further economic benefits for society, in the form of 
productivity from continued business ties and reduced opportunity 
costs. 
10 It is apt to conclude this part with the observation that through 
the provision of a robust enforcement mechanism, the Singapore 
Convention incidentally promotes mediation as a desirable and, at many 
times, appropriate alternative to international arbitration and litigation. 
From the economic point of view of a consumer in the market for 
dispute resolution services, parties will enjoy cost-saving and qualitative 
benefits, for they are provided with access to a bigger platter of options 
                                                          
25 Stacie Strong, “Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and 
Conciliation: A Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL 
Convention on International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation” University 
of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 2014-28 (2014) at p 45 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526302> (accessed 23 June 
2019). 
26 Article 5 of the Singapore Convention on Mediation contains the grounds for 
refusing to grant enforcement relief to parties that wish to enforce international 
mediated settlement agreements under the Convention’s expedited enforcement 
mechanism. 
27 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “The Future of Mediation Worldwide: Legal and Cultural 
Variations in the Uptake of or Resistance to Mediation” in Essays on Mediation – 
Dealing with Disputes in the 21st Century (Ian Macduff ed) (Wolters Kluwer, 2016) 
at p 31. 
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to choose from. It is possible for them to better tailor how they wish to 
proceed to resolve their disputes. 
III. Scope of the Convention 
11 This part first examines the kinds of IMSAs which fall within 
the reach of the Convention. Second, it discerns the forms of IMSAs 
which have been expressly excluded from its reach, including those 
which may be enforced under other treaties. Finally, it examines the 
possibility of reservations made by signatory states. 
A. Reach of the Convention 
(1) Introduction 
12 According to Art 1(1), the Singapore Convention applies to 
international agreements resulting from mediation and concluded in 
writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute. In this part, the 
authors will establish the meaning of “international”, “commercial” and 
“mediation”. The essentials of the “in writing” requirement will be 
investigated below,28 where the formalities required for enforceable 
IMSAs under the Convention are laid out. 
(2) International 
13 Article 1(1) of the Convention provides a functional elucidation 
as to what forms of settlement agreements are “international”: 
(a) At least two parties to the settlement agreement have their 
places of business in different States; or 
(b) The State in which the parties to the settlement agreement 
have their places of business is different from either: 
(i) The State in which a substantial part of the 
obligations under the settlement agreement is performed; or 
(ii) The State with which the subject matter of the 
settlement agreement is most closely connected. 
14 If a party has more than one place of business, the relevant place 
of business – according to Art 2(1)(a) – is that which has the closest 
relationship to the dispute resolved by the “settlement agreement, 
having regard to the circumstances known to, or contemplated by, the 
parties at the time of the conclusion of the settlement agreement”. If a 
                                                          
28 See paras 37–41 below. 
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party does not have a place of business, reference is to be made to the 
party’s habitual residence under Art 2(1)(b). 
15 The drafters of the Convention have prescribed a functional 
definition of “international” disputes, since in practice there is no 
concept of a “seat” of mediation.29 In contrast, the “seat” of an 
international arbitration would allow for the internationality of a foreign 
arbitral award to be determined: Art I of the New York Convention 
provides that it “shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards made in the territory of a State [that is, the “seat”] other 
than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are 
sought” [emphasis added].30 Without a discernible “seat” of mediation, 
there is no meaningful comparator against which a mediated settlement 
agreement may be deemed “foreign” (and thus, “international”).31 The 
provision of a definition of “international” in the Convention is essential 
as it overcomes this rudimentary issue, in line with the norm amongst 
mediation practitioners who have traditionally referred to mediated 
settlement agreements as of either an “international” or “domestic” 
character.32 
(3) Commercial 
16 Whilst Art 1(1) of the Singapore Convention restricts its scope 
to “commercial” disputes, what constitutes a “commercial” dispute is not 
defined anywhere within the Convention. However, it has been 
generally defined with the assistance of illustrations provided in 
footnote 1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation,33 which was drafted alongside the Convention: 
The term ‘commercial’ should be given a wide interpretation so as to 
cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, 
whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature 
include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade 
transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; 
distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; 
                                                          
29 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 39–40. 
30 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(330 UNTS 3) (10 June 1958; entry into force 7 June 1959) (hereinafter “New York 
Convention”) Art 1. 
31 Shouyu Chong & Nadja Alexander, “Singapore Convention Series: Why Is There 
No Seat of Arbitration?” Kluwer Mediation Blog (1 February 2019). 
32 See generally EU Mediation Law Handbook – Regulatory Robustness Ratings for 
Mediation Regimes (Nadja Alexander et al eds) (Wolters Kluwer, 2017). 
33 GA Res 73/199, adopted at the United Nations General Assembly, 73rd Session 
(20 December 2018). 
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factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; 
licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation 
agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial 
or business cooperation; and carriage of goods or passengers by air, 
sea, rail or road. 
The scope of the Convention is limited to “commercial” disputes, for the 
drafters affiliated with UNCITRAL (that is, WG II) are conventionally 
empowered by such a circumscribed mandate. The drafters are mindful 
of avoiding any conflict with domestic public policies, which could arise 
if the Convention were designed to address non-commercial matters. 
Such conflict is less likely to occur if the Convention were architectured 
to regulate transactions exclusively in the business realm. Hence, 
consumer disputes “for personal, family or household purposes” and 
those involving “family, inheritance or employment law” are excluded 
from the scope of the Convention under Art 1(2). 
(4) Mediation 
17 “Mediation” is broadly established under Art 2(3) of the 
Singapore Convention to be: 
… a process, irrespective of the expression used or the basis upon 
which the process is carried out, whereby parties attempt to reach an 
amicable settlement of their dispute with the assistance of a third 
person or persons (‘the mediator’) lacking the authority to impose a 
solution upon the parties to the dispute. 
It is noteworthy that most private international law conventions avoid 
providing with watertight clarity definitions of the institution which 
they govern,34 for omnis definitio in jure periculosa est.35 This raises the 
concern that providing watertight definitions of meaning of words in 
legislative or conventional texts could unduly fetter its administration. 
A broad functional definition36 is useful to inform administrators of the 
                                                          
34 Michele Graziadei, “Recognition of Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
under the Hague Trusts Convention with Particular Regard to the Italian 
Experience” in Re-imagining the Trust – Trusts in Civil Law (Lionel Smith ed) 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) at p 45. For instance, the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (11 April 1980; entry 
into force 1 January 1988) does not provide a definition of what constitutes a “sale” 
under the Convention; and the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and 
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (29 May 1993; entry into force 
1 May 1995) does not provide a definition of what constitutes “adoption” under 
the Convention. 
35 In English, these words mean: “Every definition in law is perilous.” 
36 The definition is functional as “the provision looks to the nature of the dispute 
resolution process rather than the label, so that parties need not [pedantically] use 
the term mediation for the Convention to apply”: Nadja Alexander & Shouyu 
Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention on Mediation – 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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Convention, as well as parties relying on it, that a diversity of facilitative 
and advisory mediation processes would be covered, to the exclusion of 
determinative processes such as arbitration and adjudication.37 
18 The application of the Convention in practice will show 
whether the definition of mediation in Art 2(3) is too broad. The 
definitional elements of amicable settlement, assistance of third 
person(s) and no authority to impose a solution may be invoked for 
procedures that are usually distinguished from mediation.38 To give 
some examples, conciliation and ombud proceedings would commonly 
comply with this definition (except in those cases where they are 
unilaterally binding). Both are procedures where the parties attempt an 
amicable solution with the assistance of a third person without decision-
making powers. The same is true for neutral evaluation, mini-trial and 
expert opinion.39 Should the courts wish to narrow the scope of 
application, then they could require a qualified procedural involvement 
of the third person. This would exclude mechanisms such as an expert 
opinion where a third party essentially provides the parties with 
information, but usually does not engage in a procedure aiming at 
amicable solution. 
19 Similarly, questions will be raised whether the functional 
definitions provided for “mediation” and “the mediator” in the 
Convention embrace technological innovations in dispute resolution. 
An example is the provision of dispute resolution services with the 
assistance of artificial intelligence algorithms.40 The definition of “the 
mediator” may be understood with some nuance to accommodate 
                                                                                                                               
Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams tijdschrisft voor 
Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 41. 
37 Take, for example, the adjudication regime administered by the Singapore 
Mediation Centre governed by the relevant Singapore Building and Construction 
Industry Security of Payment legislation and rules: see Singapore Mediation 
Centre, “Adjudication” <www.mediation.com.sg/business-services/adjudication/> 
(accessed 23 June 2019). 
38 For functional definitions of common dispute resolution mechanisms, see Felix 
Steffek, “Principled Regulation of Dispute Resolution: Taxonomy, Policy, Topics” 
in Regulating Dispute Resolution: ADR and Access to Justice at the Crossroads (Felix 
Steffek et al eds) (Hart Publishing, 2013) at pp 36–43. 
39 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 41: “As a result, processes 
such as neutral evaluation and mini-trial conceivably would fall within the 
definition of mediation.” 
40 For an overview of the capabilities of artificial intelligence in dispute resolution see 
Ludwig Bull & Felix Steffek, “Die Entschlüsselung rechtlicher Konflikte: Der 
Einsatz künstlicher Intelligenz zur Ermittlung von Entscheidungsfaktoren der 
Konfliktlösung” (2018) 21 Zeitschrift für Konfliktmanagement 165. 
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technological innovations, especially if one accepts the possibility of 
granting legal personality to artificial intelligence software systems.41 
B. Exclusions 
20 The Singapore Convention embraces both institutional and 
ad hoc mediation, so long as the subject matter of the mediation is of an 
international and commercial nature and not excluded by Art 1(2) 
or 1(3). First, as mentioned earlier, consumer disputes “for personal, 
family or household purposes” and those involving “family, inheritance 
or employment law” are excluded from the scope of the Convention 
under Art 1(2). 
21 Second, according to Art 1(3), the Convention expressly 
excludes IMSAs that: 
(a) have been approved by a court or have been concluded 
in the course of court proceedings; 
(b) are enforceable as a judgment in the state of that 
court; or 
(c) have been recorded and are enforceable as an arbitral 
award. 
These exclusions must be understood in light of one of the Convention’s 
aims to serve as a gap filler in the cross-border enforcement of IMSAs.42 
For instance, IMSAs may arise from court or arbitral proceedings and 
may be recorded as a judicial settlement under the Hague Convention of 
30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements43 (“HCCCA”) or as an 
arbitral consent award enforceable under the New York Convention.44 
                                                          
41 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 41, citing Paulius Čerka, 
Jurgita Grigienė & Gintarė Sirbikytė, “Is It Possible to Grant Legal Personality to 
Artificial Intelligence Software Systems?” (2017) 33 CL&SR 685. 
42 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “The New UN Convention on Mediation 
(aka the ‘Singapore Convention’) – Why It’s Important for Hong Kong” (2019) 
Hong Kong Lawyer 26 at 28. 
43 See Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (30 June 
2005; entry into force 1 October 2015) Art 12. 
44 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) 
at pp 3021–3027; see also Art 30 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (A/40/17, Annex I; A/61/17, Annex I) (21 June 1985; 
amended 7 July 2006). Readers should note that in order for arbitral consent 
awards derived as a result of mediation to be enforceable under the New York 
Convention: 
… [a]n arbitral tribunal [must have] the authority to make [the] consent 
award [which accrues] only if the parties commenced an arbitration regarding 
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22 The exclusions made by Art 1(3) of the Convention deconflicts 
the administration of the Convention with the above-mentioned 
international instruments. Essentially, the Convention will serve to 
enforce IMSAs which cannot be enforced under the HCCCA or the 
New York Convention. An example is an out-of-court settlement 
agreement that is not brought back before a sitting judge in a state court 
for judicial approval with the aim of enforcement under the HCCCA. As 
a result, this agreement is ineligible for such enforcement as it is not a 
“judgment” or “judicial settlement”.45 
23 Article 7 of the Convention preserves the signatory states’ 
subsisting obligations to other treaties when it comes to the relevant 
rights associated with settlement agreements. For instance, where there 
are subsisting bilateral or multilateral arrangements governing how 
settlement agreements arising from investor–State disputes may be 
enforced, the Singapore Convention will be administered in a manner 
which does not cause any interference with those subsisting obligations, 
but only to such an extent where the relevant laws would permit.46 
C. Possible reservations 
24 The Singapore Convention provides for the possibility of only 
two reservations.47 The first allows a signatory State to exclude 
transactions to which it is a party, or to which any governmental agency 
or any person acting on behalf of a governmental agency is a party.48 
The second allows signatory states to reverse the default application of 
the Convention by providing an opt-in regime instead. This means that 
obligations under the Convention would only apply in that State if the 
parties to an IMSA have agreed for the Convention to apply. 
Interestingly, both reservations contain dynamic language (“to the 
extent”). This means that signatory states can choose which of the three 
                                                                                                                               
an actual dispute. The authority to make a consent award does not extend to 
cases where the parties settle a dispute and then subsequently commence an 
arbitration solely for the purpose of recording the settlement as a consent 
award. 
 See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 
2014) at p 3023. 
45 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention of 30 June 2005 on 
Choice of Court Agreements: Explanatory Report (by Trevor Hartley & Masato 
Dogauchi) at paras 206–209. 
46 Article 7 of the Singapore Convention on Mediation reads: 
This Convention shall not deprive any interested party of any right it may 
have to avail itself of a settlement agreement in the manner and to the extent 
allowed by the law or the treaties of the Party to the Convention where such 
settlement agreement is sought to be relied upon. 
47 Singapore Convention on Mediation Arts 8(1)–8(2). 
48 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 8(1)(a). 
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types of entities (State, agencies, persons acting on behalf of agencies) 
will benefit from the first reservation. As regards the second reservation, 
the dynamic wording means that parties can opt into the Convention by 
degree and not just all-or-nothing. 
25 The following considerations may apply when potential 
signatory states decide for themselves if they should lodge a reservation 
(particularly, the second reservation) when they sign on to the 
Singapore Convention. On the one hand, a reservation which grants 
parties the freedom to opt for the Convention’s application would give 
effect to party autonomy. The success rate for mediation in some 
jurisdictions may hinge on having the freedom for commercial parties at 
mediation to pick and choose their desired cross-border enforcement 
mechanism (that is, whether the Singapore Convention or a more 
familiar and subsisting legal framework for enforcement should apply). 
It is advised, however, that states investigate empirically, for example, 
through industry and public consultations, if this would hold true for 
their jurisdiction before making the reservation. 
26 On the other hand, providing that the Convention would apply 
only if parties expressly agree that it should in their IMSA could 
engender a bias for maintaining the status quo.49 Parties might resist 
modifying the status quo of the Convention’s non-application by simply 
not taking the additional step of inserting an opt-in clause in their IMSA 
and agreeing to its application. To counteract the status quo bias, 
mediators possessed with the knowledge that parties intend to take their 
IMSA into an opt-in jurisdiction for enforcement should advise parties 
accordingly, and alert them to the availability for expedited enforcement 
under the Convention. It remains to be seen if this is an effective 
strategy to promote the Convention’s use, or if there are other 
compelling means or regulatory mechanisms to encourage mediators to 
provide information to mediating parties about enforcement under the 
Singapore Convention. 
IV. The Singapore Convention and private international law: 
An overview 
27 The study of private international law presents and addresses 
three main problems in cross-border disputes.50 First, it provides conflict 
                                                          
49 Eunice Chua, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Brighter Future for 
Asian Dispute Resolution” (2019) Asian Journal of International Law 
(forthcoming) at 5–6 and 9. 
50 Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law (Paul Torremans et al 
gen eds) (Oxford University Press, 15th Ed, 2017) at p 3; Dicey, Morris and Collins 
on the Conflict of Laws (Lord Collins of Mapesbury & Jonathan Harris gen eds) 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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rules for stakeholders (for example, courts, arbitrators, mediators, 
lawyers and parties) to discern how forums seize jurisdiction over 
disputes. Second, it provides conflict rules for stakeholders to discern 
the choice of law governing disputes. Third, it provides conflict rules for 
stakeholders when parties seek to get dispute resolution outcomes 
(for example, foreign court judgments, foreign arbitral awards and 
IMSAs) recognised and enforced across borders. 
28 The jurisdictional implications of the Singapore Convention are 
minimal, as it does not determine the forum competent for enforcing 
mediation agreements. It has no effect on how courts and arbitral 
tribunals seize jurisdiction over cross-border disputes. However, the 
Singapore Convention will change the way IMSAs are recognised and 
enforced. According to Art 3(1), each signatory State shall enforce a 
settlement agreement in accordance with its rules of procedure and 
under the conditions laid down in the Convention. Hence, just as how 
the New York Convention has taken away the need for “double 
exequatur” in the cross-border enforcement process of arbitral awards 
when it came into force in 1958, the Singapore Convention will have 
the same effect on IMSAs.51 Both instruments expand the number (and 
nature) of legal instruments susceptible to recognition and enforcement 
under private international law rules.52 
29 Finally, questions as to choice of law may be relevant to the 
process of seeking recognition and enforcement of IMSAs under the 
Convention, particularly when the carefully circumscribed Art 5 
defences against such recognition and enforcement are raised. The 
Convention is examined in light of these private international law issues 
below.53 
V. Jurisdiction 
30 In a 2014 study on the use and perception of cross-border 
commercial mediation, 75% of respondents thought that an 
                                                                                                                               
(Sweet & Maxwell, 15th Ed, 2012) at para 1-003; John McMillan & Nicolas 
Constable, “Private International Law” in International Commercial Law – Law 
and Practice (Petra Butler ed) (Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Peter Stone, 
EU Private International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 3rd Ed, 2014) at p 3. 
51 Timothy Schnabel, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for 
the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements” (2019) 
19 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 1 at 13. 
52 See Lucy Reed, “Ultima Thule: Prospects for International Commercial Mediation” 
NUS Centre for International Law Working Paper 19/03 (unpublished) (January 
2019) at pp 12–13 <https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3339788> (accessed 23 June 
2019). 
53 See paras 30–75 below. 
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international treaty which would provide a mechanism for the 
enforcement of mediation agreements as well as the recognition and 
enforcement of IMSAs would be desirable.54 However, WG II in the 
drafting process of the Singapore Convention deliberately left out 
provisions for the enforcement of mediation agreements, emphasising 
that mediation is a flexible alternative dispute resolution process, and 
parties may address matters which may not be expressly or implicitly 
envisaged by the mediation agreement.55 It was thought that imposing 
convention obligations on the enforcement of mediation agreements 
would engender uncertainty, as it would be difficult (and antithetical to 
the mediation process) to define with bright red lines the scope of the 
dispute covered by such an agreement. 
31 In any case, matters as to jurisdiction of a mediation “forum” are 
currently left to be governed by the rules or laws regulating mediation 
practice subsisting in each individual State. In certain instances, the 
mediation option is treated as a condition precedent, before parties may 
proceed to resolve their disputes by an adjudicative process at a court or 
in arbitration. For instance, in France, the courts have taken the view 
that mediation agreements are prima facie enforceable,56 and parties are 
bound to proceed to mediation as such before exploring other options 
to dispute resolution such as litigation. In Germany, an appropriately 
drafted57 mediation agreement is generally binding on parties and 
claims in court may not be brought before an agreed mediation session 
                                                          
54 Stacie Strong, “Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and 
Conciliation: A Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL 
Convention on International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation” University 
of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 2014-28 at p 46 (2014) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526302> (accessed 23 June 
2019). The survey presents detailed data on 34 different questions from 
221 respondents from across the world. 
55 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group II 
(Dispute Settlement), Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on 
the Work of Its Sixty-third Session (Vienna, 7–11 September 2015) (A/CN.9/861) 
(2015) at para 69. 
56 Katrin Deckert, “Mediation in Frankreich” in Mediation – Rechtstatsachen, 
Rechtsvergliech, Regelungen (Klaus J Hopt & Felix Steffek eds) (Mohr Siebeck, 
2008) at p 196; Nadja Alexander, International and Comparative Mediation – Legal 
Perspectives (Wolters Kluwer, 2009) at pp 174–175. 
57 Note that § 307 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) could render 
mediation clauses null and void “where the clause does not sufficiently clarify that 
mediation is a non-binding procedure and may be broken off at every stage of the 
negotiations”: Peter Tochtermann, “Mediation in Germany: The German 
Mediation Act – Alternative Dispute Resolution at the Crossroads” in Mediation – 
Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective (Klaus J Hopt & Felix 
Steffek eds) (Oxford University Press, 2013) at p 550. 
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has been carried out.58 In the UK,59 Hong Kong60 and Singapore,61 
instructive case precedents from the respective common law 
jurisdictions show that mediation agreements must be meticulously 
drafted. Otherwise it is likely that they would be rendered by the courts 
as unenforceable for uncertainty.62 
VI. Enforcement and recognition of IMSAs 
32 The Singapore Convention will change the recognition and 
enforcement of dispute resolution outcomes. Article 3 of the Convention 
provides: 
(1) Each party to the Convention shall enforce a settlement 
agreement in accordance with its rules of procedure and under the 
conditions laid down in this Convention. 
(2) If a dispute arises concerning a matter that a party claims was 
already resolved by a settlement agreement, a Party to the Convention 
shall allow the party to invoke the settlement agreement in accordance 
with its rules of procedure and under the conditions laid down in this 
Convention, in order to prove that the matter has already been 
resolved. 
Obviously, signatory states must give effect to the mechanisms in Art 3. 
However, they are at liberty to adapt their individual laws and rules of 
procedure to comply with the Art 3 recognition and enforcement 
mechanism,63 so long as they abide by the necessary conditions 
                                                          
58 Reinhard Greger, “Recht der alternativen Konfliktlösung” in Recht der Alternativen 
Konfliktlösung (Reinhard Greger, Hannes Unberath & Felix Steffek eds) (CH Beck, 
2nd Ed, 2016) at D 158; Peter Tochtermann, “Mediation in Germany: The German 
Mediation Act – Alternative Dispute Resolution at the Crossroads” in Mediation – 
Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective (Klaus J Hopt & Felix 
Steffek eds) (Oxford University Press, 2013) at p 549. 
59 Wah (aka Alan Tang) v Grant Thornton International Ltd [2012] EWHC 3198, 
especially at [59]–[60]. 
60 Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co Ltd v Vigour Ltd [2005] HKEC 258 
at [29]. 
61 International Research Corp plc v Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2014] 
1 SLR 130 at [54]. 
62 Cf Scandinavian Trading Tank v Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) 
[1983] QB 529 at 540. 
63 A discussion of how signatory states may do so necessitates consideration of how 
treaty obligations signed at a diplomatic level are recognised as a law of the State: 
cf Chao Hick Tin, “Early Forays in International Law” in Singapore and 
International Law – The Early Years: Essays in Memory of S. Tiwari (Kevin 
Y L Tan ed) (Centre for International Law, 2009). As the authors are confined to a 
word limit, they are unable to discuss in detail on this issue. Further, one would 
need to appreciate the differences between a monistic and dualistic interpretation 
of treaty obligations at the state level: see Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale & 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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established by the Convention in relation to scope (as discussed above), 
form and evidence (this will be discussed later in this part when Art 4 is 
addressed). It should be noted that the application of the Convention 
does not require that other states involved have also signed on to it.64 
33 On plain reading, it appears that Art 3(1) provides for an 
enforcement mechanism for IMSAs, whilst Art 3(2) provides for a 
recognition mechanism. However, as IMSAs are not procured from an 
adjudicative (or determinative) forum, it is difficult to reconcile at the 
theoretical level on what basis IMSAs may be “recognised” by courts in 
the private international law sense. The concept of “recognition” in 
private international law engenders a consideration of overlapping 
principles broadly falling under the concept of res judicata:65 such as 
cause of action estoppel,66 issue estoppel67 and the Henderson v 
Henderson68 estoppel (the last is only available in common law 
traditions). 
34 In the drafting stages, representatives from the European Union 
(“EU”) vehemently opposed including the term “recognition” 
(understood in the private international law sense) in Art 3, as in their 
opinion, res judicata should theoretically apply to matters stemming 
from acts of state (such as court judgments).69 Fortunately, 
                                                                                                                               
Sarah Williams, Cases & Materials on International Law (Oxford University Press, 
6th Ed, 2016) at pp 103–105. 
64 Hal Abramson, “New Singapore Convention on Cross-Border Mediated 
Settlements: Key Choices” in Mediation in International Commercial and 
Investment Disputes (Catharine Titi & Katia Fach-Gomez eds) (Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming, 2019) at p 18 (draft version). 
65 Dorcas Quek Anderson, “Issue Estoppel Created by Consent Judgments: 
Dissonance between the Principles Underlying Settlements and Court Decisions” 
[2017] SingJLS 100 at 101. 
66 See Thoday v Thoday [1964] 1 All ER 341 at 197, per Lord Diplock. 
67 See Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd v Management Corporation of Strata Title Plan 
No 301 [2005] 3 SLR(R) 157 at [14]–[15]. 
68 Henderson v Henderson [1843–1860] All ER Rep 378; [1843] 3 Hare 100 at 115. 
69 See, eg, intervention of the European Union, in Audio Recording: United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) 64th Session (4 February 2016) at 10:00–13:00 <http://www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/audio/meetings.jsp> (accessed 23 June 2019); this was also 
reported by Timothy Schnabel, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: 
A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated 
Settlements” (2019) 19 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 1 at 35 ff. This concern may not be 
apparent to lawyers who practice law under the common law tradition, as it is 
possible to justify the consequences of “recognition” of a dispute resolution 
outcome arising from of mediation as a means to avoid abuse of the court’s 
process: Chan Gek Yong v Violet Netto [2018] SGHC 208. In civilian law traditions, 
“recognition” of dispute resolution outcomes is tied tightly to the principle of 
res judicata excluding the Henderson v Henderson estoppel, and any concerns 
arising from re-litigation to abuse court processes are tenuous and marginalised. 
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a compromise was reached by the drafters to reflect the functional 
description of “recognition” in Art 3(2) without explicitly referring to it 
as such, avoiding irreconcilability of possibly conflicting interpretations 
of private international law “recognition” under local conditions. In any 
case, the Singapore Convention has broken new ground, as a new form 
of dispute resolution outcome, derived from a non-adjudicative process, 
may be “recognised” and enforced in private international law: that is, 
an international settlement agreement arising from mediation. 
35 For illustration, it is useful to apply the metaphors of “sword” 
and “shield” to explain the operation of Arts 3(1) and 3(2).70 The 
enforcement mechanism of Art 3(1) allows the IMSA to be used as a 
“sword” in the courts of signatory states. Parties may initiate 
proceedings to enforce the contractual obligations enshrined within the 
said IMSA against each other. Enforcement would normally be granted 
by the courts if the necessary conditions established by the Convention 
in relation to scope, form and evidence are fulfilled and the parties 
cannot prove the existence of one or more Art 5 grounds for refusal.71 
36 The recognition mechanism of Art 3(2) allows the IMSA to be 
used as a “shield” in the courts of signatory states. Parties may “invoke 
the settlement agreement” as a defence and in dismissal (or striking out) 
proceedings to show in court that they have “already resolved” issues 
that are being raised for a second time in court at mediation, which was 
concluded through the signing of a written IMSA. Similarly, recognition 
in this form would normally be granted by the courts unless the 
requirements in relation to scope, form and evidence are not fulfilled, or 
the parties may prove that one or more Art 5 grounds for refusal exists. 
VII. Requirements for enforcement 
37 At this juncture, it is appropriate to investigate the necessary 
conditions established by the Convention in relation to scope, form and 
evidence (mostly encapsulated in Art 4). Then the Art 5 grounds will be 
introduced, which the parties may prove to a court in a signatory State 
in order to negate the recognition and enforcement mechanism of Art 3. 
For convenience, the authors will refer to the recognition and 
enforcement mechanism of the Convention collectively as one of 
                                                          
70 Cf Timothy Schnabel, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for 
the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements” (2019) 
19 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 1 at 35 ff. 
71 It should be noted that the ability for courts of signatory states to review the 
obligations enshrined within the international mediated settlement agreements are 
strictly and exhaustively confined to those found in Art 5 of the Singapore 
Convention on Mediation. This will be explained at paras 42–61 below. 
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enforcement, to avoid repetition of the terms of art. Whatever applies to 
enforcement of IMSAs should also apply to its recognition. 
38 If parties wish to enforce an IMSA which falls within the scope 
described above72 in accordance with the Singapore Convention, they 
must simply fulfil the following conditions according to Art 4 of the 
Convention: 
(a) produce the written73 IMSA in the court of a signatory 
State; and 
(b) provide evidence that the IMSA has arisen from a 
mediation74 process. 
The written requirement is fulfilled “if its content is recorded in any 
form … [including] an electronic communication if the information 
contained therein is accessible so as to be useable for subsequent 
reference”.75 
39 The precise form requirements are minimal and are explained 
by Art 4 of the Convention. The written IMSA produced shall be signed 
by the parties.76 Article 4(2) of the Convention, which is generally 
derived from Art 9 of the United Nations Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts,77 provides that 
electronic signatures that may suitably be “used to identify the parties or 
the mediator and to indicate [their] intention in respect of the 
information contained in the [relevant] electronic communication” will 
suffice.78 As the written and signature requirements may be fulfilled by 
suitable electronic communications, the Singapore Convention 
accommodates IMSAs arising from online dispute resolution forums, 
which may be administered using various channels of electronic 
communication (for example, online conference calls, instant text 
messaging and online dispute resolution platforms which may or may 
not be run by artificial intelligence algorithms). 
40 Nevertheless, parties must provide the enforcing courts with the 
necessary evidence proving that the IMSA has in fact arisen from 
mediation.79 Those IMSAs procured outside of a mediation forum are 
not amenable to enforcement under the Convention. To prove that 
                                                          
72 For example, the dispute must be a “commercial” and “international” one. 
73 Singapore Convention on Mediation Arts 1(1) and 2(2). 
74 As defined in Art 2(3) of the Singapore Convention on Mediation. 
75 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 2(2). 
76 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 4(1)(a). 
77 23 November 2005; entry into force 1 March 2013. 
78 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 4(2)(a). 
79 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 4(1)(b). 
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mediation has taken place, parties may provide the court with an IMSA 
endorsed with the mediator’s signature,80 a document signed by the 
mediator affirming that mediation has taken place leading to the 
conclusion of the IMSA,81 or an attestation by the relevant dispute 
resolution service provider administering the mediation.82 Furthermore, 
Art 4(1)(b)(iv) is a “catch-all” provision that grants the competent 
authority of the signatory State some autonomy to decide what proof 
may be furnished to show that the IMSA sought to be enforced had in 
fact arisen from mediation.83 It is suggested that a mediation agreement 
for the matter provides such proof.84 Under Art 4(4) of the Convention 
competent authority may require any necessary document in order to 
verify that the requirements of the Convention have been complied 
with. 
41 Aside from these conditions, there are no other formalities such 
as notarisation, requirements to use locally licensed mediators or the 
like. Signatory states may not impose further requirements.85 However, 
even if the Art 4 conditions may be fulfilled, the courts of signatory 
states possess the discretion to refuse enforcement of IMSAs if an 
aggrieved party can prove one or more of the Art 5 grounds for refusal 
from enforcement relief. 
VIII. Grounds for refusal of enforcement 
A. Overview 
42 Article 5 of the Convention defines exhaustively the grounds for 
refusal of enforcement of IMSAs which have satisfied the Art 4 
conditions.86 Article 5(1), which provides that the “competent 
                                                          
80 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 4(1)(b)(i). 
81 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 4(1)(b)(ii). 
82 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 4(1)(b)(iii). 
83 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 4(1)(b)(iv); Nadja Alexander & Shouyu 
Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention on Mediation – 
Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams tijdschrisft voor 
Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 44. 
84 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group II 
(Dispute Settlement), Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on 
the Work of Its Sixty-third Session (Vienna, 7–11 September 2015) (A/CN.9/861) 
(2015) at para 68. 
85 Timothy Schnabel, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for 
the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements” (2019) 
19 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 1 at 33. 
86 See paras 37–41 above. Eunice Chua, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: 
A Brighter Future for Asian Dispute Resolution” (2019) Asian Journal of 
International Law (forthcoming) at 7. 
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authority … where relief is sought under article 4 may refuse to grant 
relief ” [emphasis added] if any of the Art 5(1) grounds are proven, 
seems to provide the courts of signatory states with some residual 
discretion to nonetheless enforce the IMSA.87 Article 5(2) makes similar 
provisions.88 
43 An area for further research could lie in respect to examining 
the nature of the residual discretion which a court of a signatory State 
may possess to enforce an IMSA even though one of the grounds for 
refusal under Art 5 of the Convention is proved. Some guidance may be 
taken from the literature in international arbitration.89 Hill has astutely 
observed that in arbitration, such a discretion is likely administered 
within narrow circumstances:90 
As a general rule, if a defence to enforcement … is established, 
enforcement will be (and should be) refused. [However, to] this 
general principle, there is a limited number of exceptions …, which 
are based on intelligible legal principles, rather than the court’s 
perception of what would be fair in all the circumstances. 
Whilst the debate on the extent of the discretion possessed by the 
competent authority remains a live one, it is not within the scope of this 
article. As the body of precedents and examples of IMSA enforcement 
(or challenges to its enforcement) under the Singapore Convention grow 
subsequent to its signing in Singapore in August 2019, it is hoped that a 
thorough investigation of the nature of such judicial discretion will be 
engaged in future. 
44 Article 5 may be divided into four broad categories: grounds for 
refusal tied to (a) the law of obligations; (b) mediator (mis)conduct; 
(c) public policy; and (d) subject matters not amenable to mediation. 
                                                          
87 Consider by close analogy the position in international commercial arbitration 
vis-à-vis the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards under 
the New York Convention: Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 
2003) at para 26-68. Article 5(2) of the Singapore Convention on Mediation 
similarly provides. 
88 It is worth noting that Art 5(1) of the Singapore Convention on Mediation requires 
parties to furnish proof to the relevant competent authority that one or more 
grounds for refusal under that provision may exist, whilst Art 5(2) provides that 
the relevant competent authority may under its own authority and volition find 
that such grounds for refusal under that provision may exist, without – 
technically – first having parties to furnish such proof. 
89 See Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2003) at para 26-68. 
90 Jonathan Hill, “The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Relation to Applications to 
Enforce Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention 1958” (2016) 
36 OxJLS 304 at 333. 
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They will each be examined in turn. It shall also be proposed that there 
is one further “implied” ground for refusal of enforcement, stemming 
from the administration of Art 6 of the Convention. 
B. Grounds for refusal based on the law of obligations 
45 Article 5(1) of the Convention contains seven grounds for 
refusal of enforcement of IMSAs based on the law of obligations. An 
IMSA may be refused enforcement by the courts of signatory states if: 
(a) a party to it was under some incapacity at its 
conclusion;91 
(b) it is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed under the applicable law;92 
(c) it is not binding, or is not final, according to its terms;93 
(d) it has been subsequently modified;94 
(e) the obligations in it have been performed;95 
(f) the obligations in it are not clear or comprehensible;96 
or 
(g) granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the 
settlement agreement.97 
These grounds for refusal will be explained briefly in turn. 
46 First, in respect to the incapacity of parties to the IMSA, the 
provision applies to both natural and legal persons. “Incapacity” is a 
term of art which cannot be understood in isolation. It is challenging to 
approach the concept of “incapacity” from an autonomous perspective, 
because there are fundamental differences in its concept from within 
civil and common law traditions.98 Hence, in order to meaningfully 
examine this ground of refusal, one must first identify the governing law 
                                                          
91 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(a). 
92 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(b)(i). 
93 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(b)(ii). 
94 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(b)(iii). 
95 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(c)(i). 
96 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(c)(ii). 
97 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(d). 
98 For instance, the capacity of natural persons in civil law jurisdictions is 
generally governed by the law of their nationality, while the capacity of natural 
persons in common law jurisdictions is governed by the law of their domicile: 
Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) 
at pp 3489–3490. 
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of the IMSA: how this is done will be analysed below,99 which 
investigates the choice of law issues that may arise under the Singapore 
Convention. Nevertheless, from a general understanding of the concept, 
this provision is relevant for consideration when parties involved in the 
conclusion of the IMSA are minors, natural persons with intellectual 
disabilities or deficits, or legal persons not validly represented. 
47 Second, the defence available when the IMSA is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed under the applicable law 
may be further elucidated in three separate parts. IMSAs that are “null 
and void” are defective at the point in time when they are concluded; 
defects which arise subsequently should not render the IMSA “null and 
void”.100 Rather, IMSAs that are “inoperative” are ineffective because of 
circumstances transpiring at or after the moment of their conclusion.101 
IMSAs that are “incapable of being performed” are (or become) 
impossible to execute or enforce, perhaps owing to supervening 
occurrences transpiring after its conclusion,102 or poor drafting.103 The 
                                                          
99 See paras 64–67 below. 
100 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 45. See also George 
A Bermann, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The 
Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts” 
in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The Interpretation 
and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts (George 
A Bermann ed) (Springer, 2017) at p 23. 
101 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 45. See also George 
A Bermann, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The 
Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts” 
in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The Interpretation 
and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts (George 
A Bermann ed) (Springer, 2017) at p 23. 
102 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 45. Also see George 
A Bermann, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The 
Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts” 
in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The Interpretation 
and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts (George 
A Bermann ed) (Springer, 2017) at p 24. 
103 See Aldo Frignani, “Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention 
in Italy” in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The 
Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts 
(George A Bermann ed) (Springer, 2017) at p 568: an interesting example was 
reported in this publication, where a party from Italy and one from Syria agreed 
that “any dispute arising … shall be settled by a sole arbitrator …. [T]he arbitrator 
shall be an expert in Swiss law and in the production of Arabic bread”. However, 
(cont’d on the next page) 
© 2019 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 
472 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2019) 31 SAcLJ 
 
considerations that arise after the applicable law (that is, choice of law) 
has been determined shall be left to a discussion below.104 
48 Third, IMSAs which are not binding, or are not final, according 
to their terms may be refused enforcement. These IMSAs would have 
incorporated terms and conditions which provide expressly or impliedly 
that they have no final or binding effect.105 
49 Fourth, if some of the terms of an IMSA have been validly 
modified (according to the relevant governing law of the transaction), 
the original settlement agreement will be rendered ineffectual, owing to 
the conclusion of a varied subsequent agreement. This means that only 
the varied subsequent IMSA may be enforced; hence, it follows that the 
original IMSA must be refused enforcement. 
50 Fifth, if the obligations in an IMSA have been performed 
(according to the relevant governing law of the transaction), it follows 
that courts must refuse enforcement of that IMSA as those obligations 
have been discharged by performance. This prevents parties from 
making doubled claims. 
51 Sixth, if the obligations contained in an IMSA are not drafted in 
a clear or comprehensible fashion, courts may refuse to enforce it. It 
bears emphasis that meticulous drafting is necessary. Obviously, key 
terms and obligations (such as price to be paid, or consideration 
amounts due from one party to another in exchange for carefully or 
specifically defined performances due) must be elucidated with care and 
sufficiency. The drafters of an IMSA should spell out the precise actions 
required or expected of parties, especially when the obligations derived 
from a compromise at mediation do not involve the payment of money. 
For instance, if a party to a mediation has agreed to apologise to another, 
the terms of the IMSA could be worded as such: 
Timothy Pte Ltd shall publish the following words, 
‘We unconditionally and sincerely express our deepest apologies to 
Bergeling AB and their associates for any embarrassment resulting 
from the words our employees have caused to be published on the 
FunTube, which is a popular video sharing site, and on their behalf 
offer to rescind those embarrassing statements made’, on the front 
                                                                                                                               
this agreement was determined by courts to be incapable of being performed for 
no arbitrator satisfying both conditions could be identified. 
104 See paras 68–71 below. 
105 See Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore 
Convention on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 
22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 
at 45, on this and the subsequent observations in the main text at paras 49–57 
below. 
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pages of the relevant local newspapers, The Fun Times and The 
Cheerful Nightly, and on their social media platforms (such as 
FunBook and Fun-gram), as a form of apology to Bergeling AB, in 
return for Bergeling AB’s application to discontinue Suit No XYZ/2019 
and Suit No ABC/2019. 
To conclude a mediation by getting parties to agree to simplistically 
worded terms (eg, that “Timothy Pte Ltd shall apologise to Bergeling 
AB”) might risk producing an IMSA too unclear for enforcement. 
52 Seventh, an IMSA may be refused enforcement if granting relief 
would be contrary to its terms. For instance, when conditions precedent 
or conditions subsequent contained in an IMSA have not been fulfilled, 
courts of signatory states may refuse its enforcement, for the obligations 
in it do not accrue at the instance when enforcement is being sought.106 
This provision also provides the parties with the possibility to opt out of 
the application of the Singapore Convention entirely.107 This ground for 
refusal of enforcement also gives effect to force majeure clauses: if a 
contractually anticipated supervening event transpires and the terms of 
the IMSA have provided for a discharge of obligations accordingly, 
a court in a signatory State may refuse its enforcement because it would 
be contrary to its terms to do so. 
C. Grounds for refusal based on mediator (mis)conduct 
53 Article 5(1) of the Convention contains two further grounds for 
refusal of enforcement of IMSAs, which are tied to mediator conduct. 
The court of the signatory State may first refuse enforcement of an 
IMSA where there was a “serious breach by the mediator of standards 
applicable to the mediator or the mediation without which breach that 
party would not have entered into the settlement agreement” [emphasis 
added].108 Parties seeking to avoid enforcement under the Convention 
must demonstrate that an egregious breach of mediator standards had 
occurred when the IMSA put into question was concluded at the end of 
a mediation, with reference to the proper standards by which the 
mediator must abide when facilitating the mediation. Additionally, 
                                                          
106 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group II 
(Dispute Settlement), Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work 
of Its Sixty-eighth Session (A/CN.9/934) (New York, 5–9 February 2018) at para 57. 
107 Timothy Schnabel, “The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for 
the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements” (2019) 
19 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 1 at 56 ff; Hal Abramson, “New Singapore Convention on 
Cross-Border Mediated Settlements: Key Choices” in Mediation in International 
Commercial and Investment Disputes (Catharine Titi & Katia Fach-Gomez eds) 
(Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2019) at p 14 (draft version). 
108 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(e). 
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parties must demonstrate that it was that breach which caused parties to 
have concluded the IMSA in question. The element of causation is 
crucial in the administration of this ground for refusal of enforcement. 
54 The second ground for refusal tied to mediator conduct is 
essentially a specific example of the first: the court of the signatory State 
may refuse enforcement of an IMSA where:109 
… [t]here was a failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties 
circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s 
impartiality or independence and such failure to disclose had a 
material impact or undue influence on a party without which failure 
that party would not have entered into the settlement agreement. 
[emphasis added] 
Similarly, the element of causation is crucial in the administration of this 
ground for refusal of enforcement, which is tied to mediator conduct. 
Parties seeking to avoid enforcement under this provision in the 
Convention must demonstrate with justifiable evidence that the 
mediator’s misconduct is one associated with his or her capability to be 
impartial or independent at the mediation table. If this can be proven, 
parties must additionally show that they were under undue influence,110 
or some other material form of pressure or predisposition (for instance, 
if there was a misrepresentation of the terms contained in the IMSA or 
an unconscionable111 exertion swaying its outcome), stemming from 
that mediator’s misconduct to accept the IMSA on its terms without 
further independent contemplation. 
D. Grounds for refusal based on public policy 
55 Article 5(2)(a) of the Convention provides that the competent 
signatory state authority may refuse to enforce IMSAs which are 
“contrary to the public policy” of the State where enforcement is sought. 
It should be stressed that the public policy defence administered at the 
enforcement stage of a cross-border dispute resolution outcome ought 
to be considered in light of prevailing private international law 
principles, which envisage a scrutiny of both domestic and international 
elements.112 Whilst the domestic public policy of the State in which 
                                                          
109 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(f). 
110 Cf Chan Gek Yong v Violet Netto [2018] SGHC 208. 
111 See BOM v BOK [2019] 1 SLR 349 at [142] ff for a recent pronouncement by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal on what qualities of unconscionable action exerted by 
stakeholders to a contract during the process of contract formation may result in 
an avoidance of contractual obligations. 
112 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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enforcement is sought should be given due regard, it must be considered 
“in a manner that is consistent, insofar as possible, with the objectives of 
the Convention and the public policies and interests of other 
Contracting States”.113 Thus, it is submitted that the courts of signatory 
states should apply their discretion when administering this ground for 
refusal, to nevertheless permit enforcement of IMSAs even if they run 
afoul of some domestic public policies, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances.114 After all, it is trite that the public policy exception in 
the enforcement context of cross-border dispute resolution outcomes 
functions as an “escape mechanism”.115 
56 An illustration of an exceptional circumstance where a court 
may refuse the enforcement of an IMSA based on public policy grounds 
is provided by the recent case of Daiichi Sankyo Co Ltd v Malvinder 
Mohan Singh116 decided in the High Court of New Delhi in 2018. The 
New Delhi High Court had refused to enforce an international arbitral 
award on public policy grounds, because that award had bound young 
children (aged between eight and 12 when the arbitration was 
                                                                                                                               
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 48; cf Gary Born, 
International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) at p 3652. 
113 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) 
at p 3655; although taken out of context (ie, Born’s words refer to the New York 
Convention), the phrasing of the words applies with equal logical force to the 
Singapore Convention on Mediation as well. See Renusagar Power Co Ltd v 
General Electric Co [1994] AIR 860 at [63]. 
114 See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 
2014) at p 3659. Consider, however, the Chinese case of USA Prods v Women 
Travel [1997] SPC 35 (Chinese Zuigao Fayuan), where the court denied the 
recognition of an arbitral award under the public policy limb of the New York 
Convention because the contract in dispute was one for the performance of heavy 
metal music, which was repugnant to Chinese domestic public policy. Also 
consider Telnikoff v Matusevitch 347 Md 561 (Md Ct App, 1997), where a 
Maryland Court of Appeal denied the recognition of an English judgment which 
awarded damages for defamation, as it thought that the English defamation laws 
were contrary to a domestic public policy which protects free speech as enshrined 
in the Constitution of the United States. The courts in these cases have adopted 
parochial views of public policy when recognising and enforcing foreign judgments 
and arbitral awards, and it is hoped that they would not be followed in the context 
of enforcement of international mediated settlement agreements under the 
Singapore Convention on Mediation. 
115 Consider IPCO Nigeria Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corp [2005] EWHC 726 
at [13], where in the context of refusing to enforce arbitral awards under the 
New York Convention by reason of the relevant public policy exception, Gross J 
warned that: 
… considerations of public policy, if relied upon to resist enforcement of an 
[arbitral] award, should be approached with extreme caution … [the public 
policy exception] was not intended to furnish an open-ended escape route for 
refusing enforcement of New York Convention awards. 
116 Daiichi Sankyo Co Ltd v Malvinder Mohan Singh (2016) OMP(EFA) 
(Comm) 6/2016. 
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conducted) to be jointly and severally liable to compensate losses 
amounting to more than S$700m.117 The rendering of such an enormous 
amount of damages against minors would have been offensive according 
to the public policies of both domestic and international levels. It is 
submitted that similar considerations would apply when courts in India 
are presented with IMSAs that bind young children for enforcement 
under the Convention. 
E. Grounds for refusal based on subject matters not amenable to 
mediation 
57 Article 5(2)(b) of the Singapore Convention provides that the 
courts of a signatory State may refuse to enforce an IMSA if the “subject 
matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by mediation under 
the law of that [State]”. It is difficult to investigate this ground for refusal 
in isolation of the questions that arise in respect to the governing law of 
the IMSA, which will be discussed in some detail below.118 Parties 
seeking to avoid enforcement under this provision in the Convention 
must demonstrate that the subject matter of the dispute resolved by the 
IMSA is not susceptible to mediation under the relevant governing law. 
For instance, according to South Korean law, some intellectual property 
disputes are not capable of settlement at mediation, as it is the orthodox 
view that such disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
competent dispute resolution authorities under the Korean Intellectual 
Property Office.119 
F. Implied ground of refusal: Effect of Art 6? 
58 Article 6 of the Convention specifically addresses parallel 
proceedings. In particular, it provides for the scenario where an IMSA is 
brought into a signatory State for enforcement, but a party to the IMSA 
                                                          
117 For a deeper perusal of the facts of this curious case, readers may also want to read 
the Singapore judgment of BAZ v BBA [2018] SGHC 275, which ruled on an 
application to set aside the arbitral award discussed (ie, indeed the seat of this 
arbitration was in Singapore). Unusually, the enforcement proceedings in India 
had materialised before setting aside proceedings in Singapore was fully litigated. 
Had the verdict of the Singapore proceedings been delivered before the Indian 
proceedings were completed, the issue on refusal of enforcement of the foreign 
award against the children based on public policy grounds at the New Delhi High 
Court would have been rendered moot, because the Singapore High Court ruled to 
set aside the award against the children on its own public policy grounds. 
118 See paras 74–75 below. 
119 See Gyooho Lee, Keon-Hyung Ahn & Hacques de Werra, “Euro-Korean 
Perspectives on the Use of Arbitration and ADR Mechanisms for Solving 
Intellectual Property Disputes” (2014) 30 Arb Int’l 91 at 104. 
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challenges its enforceability in another signatory State by possibly120 
invoking the Art 5 grounds for refusal of enforcement. Where a 
challenge is mounted in one jurisdiction, the courts of the other 
signatory states may administer Art 6 of the Convention to adjourn 
their enforcement proceedings. It is not apparent from plain reading of 
the Convention what the further practical effects of Art 6 are. What are 
the follow-up powers which the adjourning court(s) may possess, once 
the challenge mounted in the other jurisdiction is indeed successful? 
59 Article VI of the New York Convention, which is similarly 
worded in comparison with Art 6 of the Singapore Convention, 
facilitates the administration of Art V(1)(e) of the New York 
Convention, which provides specifically that a court may refuse 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if it “has not yet 
become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority of the country”. There is, however, no evident 
equivalent principle in the Singapore Convention, as it does not provide 
for the setting aside of IMSAs in the first place. Moreover, Art 5 does not 
articulate a ground of refusal of enforcement on the basis that the IMSA 
sought to be enforced has been successfully challenged in another 
signatory State. Hence, it is worth considering the true effect of Art 6. 
Does it lead to an implied ground for refusal of enforcement outside the 
scope of Art 5? Or is the provision merely limited to providing the 
authority where relief is sought with a right to adjourn its decision? 
60 It is submitted that Art 6 creates an implied ground for refusal 
of enforcement, but confined to IMSAs which have been refused 
enforcement on grounds tied to the law of obligations and mediator 
misconduct.121 Consequently, Art 6 does not create a ground of refusal 
based on public policy or a subject matter not amenable to mediation.122 
This is because the legal test to determine if these two latter grounds for 
refusal are available remain unique to each signatory State.123 
For instance, it is technically possible for an IMSA to be enforced in one 
State, but for the courts of another to refuse enforcement within its 
jurisdiction on public policy grounds. The published WG II reports can 
be understood to suggest that the intended function of Art 6 of the 
                                                          
120 There is also a possibility that the challenge could be founded upon a non-
fulfilment of Art 4 formalities, but such a challenge could be rare, given the 
minimal formal requirements established by Art 4 of the Singapore Convention on 
Mediation, as explained at paras 38–41 above. 
121 Cf BAZ v BBA [2018] SGHC 275 at [50]–[52]. 
122 Shouyu Chong & Nadja Alexander, “An Implied Ground for Refusal to Enforce 
IMSAs under the Singapore Convention on Mediation: The Effect of Article 6” 
Kluwer Mediation Blog (17 February 2019). 
123 Cf BAZ v BBA [2018] SGHC 275 at [50]. 
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Convention would be similar to Art VI of the New York Convention.124 
This supports the argument for (limited) implied grounds of refusal. 
Hence, a charitable approach ought to be adopted when discerning the 
purpose and effect of Art 6. 
61 The implied grounds of refusal based on Art 6 can also be 
buttressed upon the private international law principles of recognition 
of foreign judgments (that is, one which determines finally and 
conclusively if an IMSA may be refused enforcement in that 
jurisdiction). The adjourning State would give effect to the second 
signatory State court’s judgment ruling on the specific issue of how the 
said IMSA may be refused enforcement under Art 5 grounds. Although 
it may be normal for some jurisdictions125 in respect to recognising 
foreign court judgments to require parties to sue afresh in relation to the 
matters adjudged, the courts of signatory states are, arguably, 
nonetheless obliged under their Convention obligations to recognise a 
specific judgment of the court which first determines if an IMSA may be 
refused enforcement. 
IX. Choice of law 
A. Overview 
62 To complete our report of where the Singapore Convention sits 
in light of private international law, it is imperative to shed light on 
some of the novel choice of law issues which arise as a consequence of 
the Convention’s introduction. These issues are confined to the 
enforcement stage of IMSAs, and more precisely at the point when the 
courts or other competent authorities of signatory states are asked to 
consider administering the Art 5 grounds for refusal. To recall, Art 5 
                                                          
124 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group II 
(Dispute Settlement), Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work 
of Its Sixty-eighth Session (New York, 5–9 February 2018) (A/CN.9/934) (2018) 
at para 68. 
125 According to Briggs, the Netherlands is one of such jurisdictions; see Adrian 
Briggs, “Recognition of Foreign Judgments: A Matter of Obligation” (2013) 
129 LQR 87 at 89, fn 18. In Asia, it is reported that the courts of Thailand also 
would require parties to sue afresh: Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit, “Country Report: 
Kingdom of Thailand” in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Asia (Adeline Chong ed) (Asian Business Law Institute, 2017) at para 21; however, 
the report on Thailand may be cast in doubt as it did not consider recent judicial 
precedents (such as Supreme Court decision No 6565/2544 (2001 AD)), which 
have ruled that Thai courts may recognise and enforce foreign judgments under 
specified conditions: see Tosaporn Leepuengtham, “Cross-border Enforcement of 
IP Rights in Thailand” in Research Handbook on Cross-border Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property (Paul Torremans ed) (Elgar, 2014) at pp 105–106. 
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may be divided into four broad categories: grounds for refusal based on 
(a) the law of obligations; (b) mediator misconduct; (c) public policy; 
and (d) subject matters not amenable to mediation. They will each be 
examined in turn. 
B. Grounds for refusal based on the law of obligations 
63 Due to space constraints, only the choice of law issues arising 
from these Art 5(1) grounds for refusal may be examined, where: 
(a) a party to it was under some incapacity at its 
conclusion;126 and 
(b) it is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed under the applicable law.127 
(1) Incapacity 
64 Article 5(1)(a) of the Singapore Convention is modelled after 
Art V(1)(a) of the New York Convention, but omits the choice of law 
provision (that is, the words “under the law applicable to them”).128 
Having done so, it seems on a superficial level that the drafters of the 
Convention may have intended for incapacity, as a term of art, to be 
understood from an autonomous perspective. However, as mentioned 
earlier in this article, this seems very unlikely. This is because there are 
fundamental differences between the way courts from the civil and 
common law traditions conceive of incapacity.129 Hence, a more 
nuanced interpretation of the drafters’ intention is desired. In particular, 
it is possible to treat the deliberate omission as advocating for the courts 
of signatory states to administer a more expansive choice of law 
principle when a party pleads that the IMSA sought to be enforced is 
affected by incapacity. 
65 One approach is the application of Gary Born’s “validation 
principle”, which is a modern choice of law concept postulating that 
parties, by virtue of their willing participation in international 
commerce, must be taken to have desired their contractual 
arrangements in respect to all issues of dispute resolution to be 
                                                          
126 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(a). 
127 Singapore Convention on Mediation Art 5(1)(b)(i). 
128 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group II 
(Dispute Settlement), Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work 
of Its Sixty-fifth Session (Vienna, 12–23 September 2016) (A/CN.9/896) (2016) 
at para 85. 
129 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) 
at pp 3489–3490. 
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performed to their best effect.130 Hence, “in a transaction affecting 
States A and B, with an arbitral seat in State C, the parties’ capacity to 
enter into an arbitration agreement should be upheld where any of the 
laws of States A, B or C would reach this result”.131 This would be one 
possibility to pave the way for a pro-enforcement bias. 
66 Alternatively, the courts might apply renvoi to determine if 
parties indeed have capacity when concluding an IMSA. Hence, if 
Party X (who is 19 years old) concludes an IMSA in and under the 
governing law of State A (where the age of majority is 21) but seeks its 
enforcement with the assistance of the Singapore Convention in his 
country of ordinary residence, State B (where the age of majority is 18), 
the courts in State B might administer renvoi to find that Party X has 
capacity to conclude the IMSA, if the private international law rules of 
State A determine the capacity of a person by reference to the laws of his 
State of residence. 
67 The administration of the “validation principle” and renvoi have 
not received overwhelming judicial support at this point in time.132 The 
“pro-enforcement bias” seems to encounter reluctance in practice, whilst 
the theory behind renvoi is so complex that it receives little support for 
fear of confusion. It remains to be seen if the courts in the future would 
apply these choice of law techniques when evaluating if an IMSA should 
be refused enforcement under the Convention owing to the incapacity 
of one or more parties. 
(2) Null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed 
68 On the other hand, Art 5(1)(b)(i) of the Singapore Convention 
is modelled after Art II(3) of the New York Convention, but with the 
addition of a choice of law provision (that is, the words “under the law 
to which the parties have validly subjected it or, failing any indication 
thereon, under the law deemed applicable by the competent authority”). 
Hence, it is clearly incumbent on the court of the signatory State when 
enforcing an IMSA to determine its proper law before proceeding to 
decide if it is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. 
                                                          
130 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) 
at p 3490. 
131 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) 
at p 3490. 
132 The Singapore High Court has recently rejected the applicability of the “validation 
principle” in Singapore arbitration law: BNA v BNB [2019] SGHC 142 at [52]–[66], 
per Vinodh Coomaraswamy J. Renvoi has also not received overwhelming support 
because its administration is difficult to grasp: see David Alexander Hughes, “The 
Insolubility of ‘Renvoi’ and Its Consequences” (2010) 6 Journal of Private 
International Law 195. 
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69 Having determined the proper law governing the IMSA, the 
court may proceed to evaluate if it is “null and void” under that 
governing law. The IMSA may be deemed null and void if it were 
founded upon a deficient or defective agreement (or consent) between 
parties. Defences falling under the law of obligations which may be 
relevant for the court’s consideration are misrepresentation, fraud, 
duress, undue influence or unconscionability.133 
70 The court may also proceed to evaluate if the IMSA is 
“incapable of being performed” under the determined governing law. 
This would involve an examination of the provisions under the 
governing law for treatment of cases involving contractual impossibility, 
frustration or other supervening events occurring after contract 
formation.134 
71 However, the application of the governing law might be less 
straightforward for the court if it is asked to determine if the IMSA is 
“inoperative”. This is a legal term of art that is not as clearly defined in 
the contract laws of Gallic, Germanic and common law legal 
traditions.135 The courts might react by administering the defence taking 
an autonomous approach. As reported earlier, IMSAs which are found 
to be “inoperative” are those that are ineffective because of 
circumstances transpiring at or after the moment of its conclusion. This 
could occur owing to poorly drafted IMSAs which contain inherently 
contradictory or self-defeating clauses that intrinsically cancel out the 
obligations found within, rendering it sterile of any effect to begin 
                                                          
133 George A Bermann, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – 
The Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National 
Courts” in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The 
Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts 
(George A Bermann ed) (Springer, 2017) at p 23. 
134 George A Bermann, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – 
The Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National 
Courts” in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The 
Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts 
(George A Bermann ed) (Springer, 2017) at p 24. 
135 George A Bermann, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – 
The Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National 
Courts” in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The 
Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts 
(George A Bermann ed) (Springer, 2017) at p 23; and consider Konrad Zweigert & 
Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 
1998) at pp 323–469. 
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with.136 Alternatively, an IMSA may be inoperable because of a 
subsequent agreement to waive all rights to pursue remedies under it.137 
C. Grounds for refusal based on mediator misconduct 
72 In respect to the two grounds for refusal tied to mediator 
conduct in the Convention discussed earlier, choice of law 
considerations may arise when the specific ground (that is, the second 
ground, Art 5(1)(f)) is administered by the courts of the signatory State. 
The court may need to make a determination of the governing law of 
the IMSA, prior to making a determination as to whether (in addition to 
proving egregious mediator misconduct flowing from a failure to 
disclose conflicts of interest) the party pleading for the court to refuse its 
enforcement had entered into the agreement under undue influence. 
However, parties pleading for the court to refuse the enforcement of 
IMSAs under this ground may also show more generally that the 
mediator misconduct had left a “material impact” on them, such that 
they would not have entered into that agreement had there been proper 
disclosure. In doing so, it may also be necessary for the courts to make a 
determination of the governing law of the IMSA to determine whether 
there was a material impact. 
D. Grounds for refusal based on public policy 
73 Just as it was analysed and reported earlier in this article, the 
public policy defence (Art 5(2)(a)) administered at the enforcement 
stage of a cross-border dispute resolution outcome ought to engage a 
scrutiny of both domestic and international elements.138 The courts of 
                                                          
136 George A Bermann, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – 
The Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National 
Courts” in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – The 
Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention by National Courts 
(George A Bermann ed) (Springer, 2017) at p 24. 
137 Consider Apple & Eve LLC v Yantai N Andre Juice Co 610 F Supp 2d 226 (ED NY, 
2009). 
138 See Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore 
Convention on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 
22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 
at 48 and Shouyu Chong, “Conflict of Laws and Cross-border Commercial 
Mediation: Breaking New Ground with the United Nations Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation through a Conflict 
of Laws Analysis of Its Grounds for Refusal to Enforce International Commercial 
Mediated Settlement Agreements” (2018) (unpublished directed research paper 
undertaken during LLM studies, National University of Singapore, archived at the 
C J Koh Law Library, National University of Singapore) at pp 26–29 
<https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/145198> (accessed 23 June 2019). 
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signatory states should apply due discretion when administering this 
ground for refusal, and nevertheless grant enforcement of IMSAs under 
the Convention even if they run incongruent with some domestic public 
policies, unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.139 
E. Grounds for refusal based on subject matters not amenable 
to mediation 
74 As mentioned earlier in this article, parties that endeavour to 
plead to the court of a signatory State that an IMSA should be refused 
enforcement on grounds that its subject matter is not amenable to 
mediation (Art 5(2)(b)) must first refer to the law of the enforcing State 
for guidance.140 However, as this is also another exceptional “escape 
mechanism” defence similar to the public policy defence,141 the 
enforcing court should apply a rather restrictive approach when 
applying this ground for refusal. 
75 Hence, whilst the enforcing court may initially make reference 
to its law when ascertaining if the IMSA sought to be enforced addresses 
a subject matter which is amenable to mediation, the competent 
authority ought to also appraise the degree to which the subject matter 
resolved at mediation has a sufficient nexus to its forum, before 
categorically declaring that its domestic rules must apply vis-à-vis the 
IMSA.142 It has been convincingly argued in the context of international 
commercial arbitration that courts should avoid parochialism when 
administering the “subject matter” defence.143 This means that the courts 
should instead assess and evaluate the availability of the defence in 
respect to the law of closest connection to the dispute resolved at 
mediation when deciding if an IMSA should indeed be refused 
                                                                                                                               
Also consider Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 
2nd Ed, 2014) at p 3652. 
139 See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 
2014) at p 3659. 
140 To reiterate, Art 5(2)(b) of the Singapore Convention on Mediation provides that 
the competent authority may refuse to enforce international mediated settlement 
agreements if the “subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by 
mediation under the law of that [State]”. 
141 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 49. 
142 Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “An Introduction to the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation – Perspectives from Singapore” (2018) 22(4) Nederlands-Vlaams 
tijdschrisft voor Mediation en conflictmanagement 37 at 49. 
143 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) 
at p 3702. 
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enforcement on grounds that its subject matter is not amenable to 
mediation.144 
X. Conclusion and outlook 
76 The authors have examined how the Singapore Convention 
gives rise to the recognition and enforcement of IMSAs, as well as the 
choice of law and private international law considerations which arise 
therein. Some analogies in principle have been drawn from the 
recognition and enforcement practice under the New York Convention 
in this commentary. Given the fledgling state of the Singapore 
Convention, following in the footsteps of an already established 
institution allows to benefit from established solutions and also ensures 
consistency across dispute resolution mechanisms. It is expected that 
once the Singapore Convention becomes more established, authorities, 
scholars and practitioners will create a genuine and elaborate body of 
principles and rules for the enforcement of IMSAs, which is a new kind 
of legal instrument. 
77 For potential signatory states, a number of questions arise 
beyond the general decision whether or not to join the Singapore 
Convention. The first set of questions concerns the exercise of 
reservations offered by the Convention.145 Should the State, its agencies 
and their representatives participate? Should the parties be required to 
actively agree to the application of the Convention in order to benefit 
from it? The second set of questions is more complex. Which new rules 
and principles are required locally in order to enforce IMSAs under the 
Convention? The Convention provides general principles. In particular, 
signatory states shall enforce a settlement agreement in accordance with 
its rules of procedure and under the conditions laid down in the 
Convention according to Art 3(1). Parties may also invoke settlement 
agreements to claim that a discrete issue was already resolved by these 
agreements under Art 3(2). Again, this shall be administered in 
accordance with the signatory State’s rules of procedure and under the 
conditions in the Convention. As a consequence, potential signatories 
                                                          
144 Take the hypothetical scenario where under the laws of Country X, commercial tax 
disputes are subject matters incapable of settlement at mediation. The forum of 
Country X is presented with an international mediated settlement agreement that 
was concluded in Country Y, of which the choice of law for that settlement points 
to the laws of Country Z (noting that under the rules of Y and Z tax disputes are 
susceptible to mediation). If the mediated dispute has no substantive connection to 
Country X, the courts of Country X should not refuse relief, and follow their 
convention obligations to enforce dispute resolution outcomes (cf Gary Born, 
International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd Ed, 2014) at pp 606 
and 3700). 
145 See paras 24–26 above. 
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must consider whether their rules of procedure applicable to the 
enforcement of international settlement agreements need updating. This 
reform process needs to reflect local particularities and the obligations 
laid down in the Convention. 
78 In Singapore, implementing the Singapore Convention could be 
straightforward.146 The formalities and scope of the Convention may be 
brought into Singapore law by an adoption of the 2018 UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International 
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation. If one were to fall 
back on the established mechanisms, then enforcement of IMSAs might 
be given effect by the Singapore courts as a consent order. Consent 
orders may also engender recognition under the common law, and 
parties may be estopped from litigating discrete issues already settled by 
the recorded IMSA.147 However, the signing of the Singapore 
Convention will present a good opportunity to consider other ways to 
enforce IMSAs in Singapore, in addition to or in substitution of consent 
orders. 
79 In a civil law jurisdiction such as Germany, which, in addition, 
is a member state of the EU, somewhat different considerations apply. 
All EU member states have implemented the Mediation Directive148 and, 
consequently, provide users with – at least – a basic framework for 
mediation. As regards enforcing IMSAs from other EU member states, 
a number of EU instruments are applicable and remain relevant under 
Art 7 of the Singapore Convention.149 The same applies as regards 
IMSAs from jurisdictions beyond the EU if international treaties such as 
the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters150 are 
relevant. The enforcement of IMSAs that fall under neither EU law nor 
                                                          
146 Also see Schnabel’s proposals in respect to its ratification in the US in Timothy 
Schnabel, “Implementation of the Singapore Convention: Federalism, Self-
Execution and Private Law Treaties” (2019) Am Rev Int’l Arb (forthcoming). 
147 In the eyes of the Singapore courts, it would be an abuse of court process to litigate 
issues already settled by mediation, articulated in an international mediated 
settlement agreement, which was subsequently recorded as a consent order: Dorcas 
Quek Anderson, “Issue Estoppel Created by Consent Judgments: Dissonance 
between the Principles Underlying Settlements and Court Decisions” [2017] 
SingJLS 100. Also see Nadja Alexander & Shouyu Chong, “Singapore Case Note: 
Interpretation of MSAs and Inadmissibility of Evidence from Mediation” Kluwer 
Mediation Blog (17 March 2019). 
148 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters at pp 3–8. 
149 On the following see Felix Steffek, “Internationales Recht” in Recht der 
Alternativen Konfliktlösung (Reinhard Greger, Hannes Unberath & Felix 
Steffek eds) (CH Beck, 2nd Ed, 2016) at F 55 ff. 
150 30 October 2007; entry into force 1 January 2010. 
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international treaties, however, is less straightforward. Hence, if 
jurisdictions such as Germany sign on to the Singapore Convention, 
a discussion is to be had – as in Singapore – on how to integrate IMSAs 
into the existing rules of enforcement. 
80 Overall, the Singapore Convention is a welcome addition and 
offers an opportunity to strengthen the international dimension of 
mediation. From the perspective of private international law, the 
Convention challenges some established principles of international 
enforcement. Whilst this challenge might create some unease, it 
provides the stakeholders of cross-border dispute resolution with an 
incredibly valuable occasion to rethink the possibilities of international 
dispute resolution. 
 
